1. 李奇泽（2016级博士生）：The Effect of Housing Wealth on Household Portfolio Choice
2. 王科（2017级博士生）：CEO Career Concern and ESG Controversies
3. 喻曾（2018级博士生）：The effect of Beating Relative Performance Goals on Corporate Investment
1. The Effect of Housing Wealth on Household Portfolio Choice
This study uses data from the 2013 China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) to investigate the effect of housing tenure decisions on households’ portfolio choices. We find that property value has a significantly positive impact on the extent to which households hold risky financial assets. Furthermore, this impact is mitigated in households that do not have full property rights over their homes, and housing characteristics that increase transaction costs reduce the proportion of households with risky financial asset holdings. These results indicate the presence of a wealth effect on households’ portfolio choices.
2. CEO Career Concern and ESG Controversies
We use Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to identify the causal impact of CEO career concerns on ESG controversies. Using the ex-ante predicted dismissal probability as a proxy for career concerns, we exploit narrowly missing the Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) target as an exogenous shock to CEO career concerns in the RDD setting. Our results suggest that career-concerned CEOs who narrowly miss the RPE target suffer less from negative exposures to ESG reputational risks in the subsequent year than otherwise similar CEOs who barely beat the target. This effect is more pronounced for firms with higher earnings volatilities and idiosyncratic risks. However, the decreases in ESG reputational risks induced by career concerns are not associated with improvements in ESG performances. On the contrary, CEO career concerns could worsen the overall ESG performances. Our findings imply that career-concerned CEOs prioritize ESG reputational risk management that produces immediate effects while neglecting actual ESG engagement that requires long-term commitments.
3. The effect of Beating Relative Performance Goals on Corporate Investment
This paper exploits a regression discontinuity design to explore the effect of beating relative performance goals on corporate investment activities. Using detailed relative performance evaluation grants of managers (CEOs) between 2001 and 2018, we discover managers who narrowly beat relative performance goals lead to an increase of corporate investment. Our results also suggest a target-beating manager act myopically after they beat relative performance goals, such as intentionally cut R&D and marketing expensing, issue more dividend and increase long-term debt. Our findings provide a causal explanation between the effect of relative performance contracts and corporate investment activities, and future improves our understanding on managerial behavior.